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Progressive Europe?
Gender and Non-Discrimination in the EU
THE ISSUE OF EQUAL RIGHTS between women and men—at least in
the workplace—has long been one of the most prominent
examples of “positive integration” in the European Union, and
arguably the most far-reaching element of EU social policy. In
recent years, the EU’s traditional emphasis on sex equality in
the workplace has been supplemented by a commitment to the
“mainstreaming” of gender issues, the upgrading of sexual
equality as a common objective in the Treaties, and the insertion
of a new Treaty provision relating to the principle of non-
discrimination more generally. These and other developments
have led some authors to present the EU as a “progressive polity”
in its commitment to gender equality and non-discrimination.
In this Forum, four authors assess this claim of a “progressive
Europe,” focusing on the evolution of EU gender policy (Sonia
Mazey, Jo Shaw, R. Amy Elman) and the development of a
broader policy regarding non-discrimination on the basis of
factors such as race, age, and sexual orientation (Mark Bell).
Taken together, the essays reveal the impressive legal and
constitutional foundations of EU gender and non-discrimination
policies, as well as the significant weaknesses of EU policy
practice, the problematic relationship between gender and other
grounds for discrimination such as race and age, and the difficulty
of measuring what constitutes “progress” in the first place.
—Forum Editor
The Development of EU Gender Policies:
Toward the Recognition of Difference
Sonia Mazey
IN THE PAST DECADE, A new phase of EU gender policy, linked to
the concept of “gender mainstreaming,” has gained rapid
ascendancy within the EU. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty marked
an important turning point in this development. The revised Treaty
elevated the status of gender equality to a “fundamental principle”
of Community activity, enshrined the principle of gender
mainstreaming into the Treaty, and widened the range of positive
action measures which may be adopted in order to benefit the
disadvantaged sex in the field of employment. In addition, sex
was incorporated into a new general non-discrimination clause
(Article 13), establishing a legal basis for EU measures to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. This constitutional
embedding of gender equality into the Amsterdam Treaty
undoubtedly represented an important victory for European
feminists (Helfferich and Kolb 2001; Mazey 2001). The key
question, however, is “whether this exercise will matter—
whether it will actually influence policy outcomes in the member-
states” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000: 445). Five years on
from the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, EU scholars have
begun to examine the evidence.
Gender mainstreaming represents the latest stage in the
incremental “broadening” of EU gender policies. In contrast to
earlier “equal treatment” and “positive action” EU equality
strategies, which, respectively, treated women the same as men
and helped women adjust to the (gender blind) male norm,
mainstreaming is based upon the recognition of gender differences
between men and women. Thus, for EU policy makers,
mainstreaming “involves not restricting efforts to promote
equality to the implementation of specific measures to help
women, but mobilizing all general policies and measures
specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively
and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible
effect on the respective situations of men and women”
(Commission of the European Communities, 2000: 5). In a broad
sense, mainstreaming is a transversal and long-term political
strategy for achieving gender equality by “engendering” the
policy-making process. More narrowly conceived, it is a method
of policy-making, which requires the adoption of particular
policy-making instruments and procedures. In particular, gender
mainstreaming has necessitated the introduction at the EU level
of  “soft” (i.e., legally non-binding) policy instruments, such as
the collection of sex disaggregated data, gender impact
assessments, benchmarking, national league tables, and gender
auditing of EU programmes.
It is important to stress that within the EU, mainstreaming
is intended to complement, not replace, positive action measures
for women and equal treatment legislation. Thus, the Community
Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005) brings
together all the different EU initiatives and programmes designed
to promote gender equality with an across-the-board
mainstreaming approach. The positive action program associated
with the Framework Strategy (to which •50 million has been
allocated) focuses upon five objectives, which provide the frame
of reference for policy development, and to which all EU gender
equality  initiatives  are  now  linked: (continued  on  next  page)Summer 2002   EUSA Review
(continued) equality in economic life (labour market policies);
equal representation and participation in decision-making (parity
democracy); equality in social life (social protection, health);
equality in civil life (human rights, gender-related violence,
trafficking), and changing gender roles and overcoming
stereotypes (in education, culture, media). Each Commission DG
is required to produce an annual work programme indicating
what actions it intends to undertake towards the above objectives.
Meanwhile, both the Commission and the European Women’s
Lobby have, wherever possible, sought to translate the gender
equality principles of the Amsterdam Treaty into a legal
framework.  Indeed, the Commission intends to introduce a new
directive later this summer, based upon Article 13, to achieve
equality of women and men outside the field of employment.
However, as the veteran feminist advocate and senior
Commission official, Agnes Hubert acknowledged, “there is only
so far we can go on this [legal] basis.” Moreover, given the highly
normative nature of gender equality issues, and the numerous
veto points in the EU legislative process, it would in any case,
be politically difficult for the Commission to “coerce” member
states into further Europeanization in this policy sector.  Against
this backdrop, mainstreaming, characterized by soft policy
instruments and “voluntary policy transfer” (Dolowitz and Marsh
2000) between member states, provides an alternative and
arguably more subtle means of achieving gender equality “by
stealth.”
Evidence suggests that gender mainstreaming has provided
feminist policy entrepreneurs (notably the EWL) with new
opportunities to engender EU policy debates within the
Commission in areas that were previously “gender blind.” New
areas analysed under a gender perspective include world trade
and globalization, EU enlargement, fisheries, and asylum and
refugee policy (Mazey, forthcoming). Gender mainstreaming
policy methods have begun to penetrate the European
Commission (albeit unevenly), prompting changes in policy
discourse, procedures and outputs. Gender awareness training,
gender impact assessments, the collection of gender desegregated
data and the insertion in all calls for proposals and expressions
of interest of a reference to EU gender equality policies have
become increasingly routine activities within the Commission.
Unsurprisingly, the impact of gender mainstreaming has been
greatest in those sectors with prior experience of dealing with
equal opportunities issues, notably employment, structural funds,
development, education and training. Policy-makers in these
sectors were already accustomed to dealing with gender issues
and working with women policy stakeholders.  Thus, in these
services, the minimum conditions required for gender
mainstreaming were (more or less) in place: understanding about
the gender problematic, appropriate methodological tools; and
inclusion of women’s interests in the policy-making process. By
contrast, in other “gender blind” sectors such as internal market,
competition policy, trade, energy and transport, mainstreaming
has thus far made less headway (Pollack and Hafner-Burton
2000; Mazey 2001). Significantly, these are also sectors in which
women have historically been less well represented in the
decision-making process. Just as in the 1970s and 1980s, feminist
advocates within the policy-making process have been influential
in achieving this latest expansion of EU gender policies.
Gender mainstreaming has presented European feminists
with both new opportunities and new strategic dilemmas. On the
one hand, mainstreaming has “legitimized” the EWL within the
EU policy-making process. The Lobby has been increasingly
active in new policy areas such as globalization and trade, EU
enlargement and EU Treaty and institutional reform.  Given the
continuing under-representation of women and lack of gender
expertise in the EU institutions, the EWL has become an
influential source of women’s representation within the EU
decision-making process. The problem is that the EWL (with
just eleven full-time staff and meagre funds) currently lacks
sufficient resources to deliver this ambitious agenda.
There is also scepticism within the Lobby regarding the likely
benefits for women of mainstreaming. Though European
feminists acknowledge the transformative potential of such a
strategy, many doubt whether there exists either the political
commitment or institutional capacity required to implement this
strategy within a multi-level polity such as the EU. Given that
national governments remain primarily responsible for
interpreting and implementing EU policies, there are grounds
for such fears. The introduction of so-called “family-friendly”
employment, for instance, has in some member states been
pursued primarily from the employers’ side, resulting in the
introduction of increasingly unpredictable, rather than shorter,
working hours. More recently, it is extremely revealing that
gender issues have not yet featured in the ongoing debates about
how European governance structures might be democratised—
an omission which suggests that gender mainstreaming has yet
to become culturally and institutionally embedded in the EU
broadly defined. In view of these uncertainties, the EWL remains
committed to grounding gender equality in law.
Lastly, many women fear that the privileged status of
women’s rights within the context of EU social policies may
also be jeopardised by the increased emphasis upon
mainstreaming. The Amsterdam Treaty established a broad
human rights framework which commits the EU to combating
various forms of discrimination. This development has
highlighted the need for European women to think more
systematically about the relationship between gender
mainstreaming and the more inclusive strategy of equality
mainstreaming. Thus far, the EWL has been reluctant to embrace
a broader definition of “equal opportunities” beyond gender
issues and has remained passive towards elderly and disability
mainstreaming initiatives. The reluctance of the Lobby to
embrace equality mainstreaming is perhaps understandable given
the present fragility of EU gender equality policies. Whilst
equality mainstreaming may ultimately be a more effective means
of incorporating “difference” into EU policies, there is a fear
that the greater effort on race, disability, religion, etc. might come
at the expense of gender.
Sonia Mazey is Faculty Lecturer in Politics and Tutorial
Fellow at Hertford College, Oxford University.EUSA Review    Summer 2002
Gender Mainstreaming and the EU Constitution
Jo Shaw
GENDER MAINSTREAMING HAS BECOME the buzz word of EU gender
policy since the mid 1990s. Its proponents argue it has greater
capacity to deliver socio-economic equity for all members of
society, by requiring the thorough scrutiny of every aspect of
policy-making, from inception to implementation. Its detractors
argue that it is rarely more than formulaic window dressing, and
that it could undermine the existing legally binding framework
of sex discrimination law. For the purposes of this essay, I shall
go with the proponents rather than the detractors. Taking an
initially optimistic point of view, I examine the extent to which
the gender-receptiveness issues raised by mainstreaming both
as a policy style and even—potentially—a new approach to
politics are embedded in EU constitutional law and discourse.
The degree of inclusiveness of a polity at the level of
constitutionalism matters. It matters whether a non-state polity
such as the EU includes within its constitutional framework
provisions on gender or race equality. The content, purpose and
function of these provisions contribute to what Neil Walker calls
the substantive and polity-defining functions of constitutionalism
(Walker 2001). It is also important to know how and why these
provisions came to be included in a constitutional text, as well
as how they have been interpreted by influential actors such as
courts, legislatures and executives. Legal feminist scholarship
has been quick to recognize the double-edged nature of taking
advantage of the privileged sites of struggle provided by
constitutional or similar norms. On the one hand, the inclusion
of a norm of equality in any constitutional text rarely “just
happens” as a top-down phenomenon. On the contrary, even if
constitutional norms are not always directly struggled over—
especially at the supranational level where there is relatively
little direct citizen access to the levers of power—new
constitutional norms are still likely at the very least to be the
filtered reflection of other struggles, ones which are perhaps more
localized or less focused on reformism and legal change. To that
extent, to harness the normative power of such provisions is to
recognize and value the transformative potential of struggle and
protest about a repressive status quo such as a restrictive gender
regime. Yet still, the very fact of engaging with the “state” or
“state power,” even in the diffused form of the EU, brings with
it the risk of assimilation into that same liberal legal order and
of diluting the limited critical resources of a radical feminist
politics.
The constitutional dimension of the EU’s gender regime
hangs by a slender historical thread: Article 119 EEC. This equal
pay provision was included in the Treaty of Rome largely to
prevent the risk of distortions of competition in the labour market
arising because France had already enacted equal pay guarantees
(Barnard 1996). Wobbe (2001) contextualizes this story by
reference to the rise of a rights ideology and a rights narrative
after the Second World War, not to mention the role taken by the
International Labour Organization in the negotiations on the EEC
Treaty (Hoskyns, 1996: 53). Until 1999, and the entry into force
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, legal change in the gender rights
field was largely driven by judicial activism focused on the Treaty
and a limited body of secondary legislation. It also depended
upon the agency of a number of key actors. The Commission
pressed for a new era of European social policy from the early
1970s and initiated sex equality legislation in the form of equal
pay and equal treatment directives. The Court of Justice famously
established the direct effect of Article 119 in the Defrenne (No.
2) case, and strategic litigants and their legal advisors and trades
unions have helped to ensure a steady flow of cases from national
courts to the Court.
As Sonia Mazey has shown above, the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam has added the imprimatur of member state approval
to these developments and embedded gender equality norms more
deeply into the fabric of the EU’s constitution, including a revised
Article 3(2) EC which enshrines the principle of gender
mainstreaming into the Treaty, an amended Article 141 (ex 119),
and the new Article 13 EC allowing the adoption of measures to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
Since Amsterdam the EU fundamental rights framework has
been transformed. A Convention of national representatives and
representatives of the EU institutions elaborated a Fundamental
Rights Charter for the EU, adopted at Nice in December 2000.
Chapter III of the Charter is simply headed “Equality” and it
contains a veritable “potpourri” of rights, some of a traditional
justiciable and constitutional type, some of a more aspirational
nature. Not all are directly concerned with gender equality, but
they do raise the question of how “differences” can be melded
together in a fundamental rights regime. Spread across seven
articles, we find equality before the law, the prohibition of
discrimination, respect for cultural, religious and linguistic
diversity, a specific guarantee of equality between men and
women in all spheres, and a range of children’s rights, rights of
the elderly, and rights of disabled persons. The Charter is not
formally binding, but it was quickly employed by Advocates
General in the Court of Justice as an inspirational source of rights
argument, although the Court itself has been more circumspect.
Should the Charter find a place as a formal element of a
“European Constitution” after the current Convention and the
2004 IGC, it will have significant effects on the nature of the
Euro-polity—effects which are hard to predict with precision
given the open-textured character of its provisions.
The evidence points towards an equality principle which is
deeply embedded in the EU’s constitutional fabric, at least in
formal terms. It also highlights the different ways the principle
can operate within the constitutional order. There are
straightforward guarantees of non-discrimination, legal bases for
implementation of the equality principle by the institutions, and
more complex and ambitious techniques to promote substantive
socio-economic equality such as gender mainstreaming and
positive action. This is fertile territory to argue that gender
mainstreaming can be more than just a technique for policy-
makers and can be instead the basis for a transformation of
politics via the overall polity-generative capacity of
constitutionalism.Summer 2002   EUSA Review
The constitutional form is unfortunately rather ahead of the
constitutional practice. There is so far little evidence that
mainstreaming is seeping into the case law of the Court of Justice,
despite the Court’s generally activist history in the promotion of
gender equality. The Court’s case law continues to distinguish
sharply between labour market issues, where its writ runs, and
those of the gendered division of labour in the household, where
it does not. “Neutral” legal categories such as rights and remedies
are not often open to specifically gendered reasoning. Even so,
it is interesting to note the Court’s increased willingness in recent
judgments to engage more fully with the wider socio-economic
circumstances in which gender relations in the family develop.
In cases such as Lommers (Case C-476/99, March 19 2002),
the Court has demonstrated a broader view of the complexities
of strategizing for equality than some of the earlier cases, not so
much because they represent a radical departure from previous
maternalist analyses exemplified by the Hoffmann case (Case
184/83 [1984] ECR 3047) and critiqued by McGlynn (2000),
but because of the greater depth of legal reasoning applied.
Feminist politics has also so far had little impact upon the
mega-constitutional events such as the Convention on the Future
of the Union or initiatives such as the Governance White Paper,
which involve a critical reflection upon the way the EU does its
business. One can point to the paucity of representation amongst
the Convention’s 105 members and 13 observers. In total, there
are ten women from the EU member states, plus six from the
accession countries. Two of the thirteen observers are women.
Only two of the twelve-member Praesidium, which effectively
controls much of the agenda of the Convention, are women, and
none of the three-member Presidency. Yet in other respects the
principles of parity democracy have seeped into the EU’s portfolio
of gender equality policies. The Commission adopted a decision
on the gender balance of Committees and Expert Groups, with a
commitment to forty percent women members, and the Council
adopted a recommendation on the balanced participation of
women and men in the decision-making process. The latter calls
for integrated strategies on the part of the member states to
address participation imbalances. The ad hoc manner in which
members are nominated for a body such as the Convention is
precisely the opposite of such an integrated strategy, and appears
to be a recipe for ensuring low levels of participation, with
everyone relying on everyone else—especially the Scandi-
navians—to ensure that women are nominated.
The proposition that policy-making operates in a gendered
environment and with effects which are not wholly gender-neutral
receives no attention whatsoever in the Governance White Paper
of July 2001. Yet gender mainstreaming:
“does not mean simply making Community programmes
or resources more accessible to women, but rather the
simultaneous mobilization of legal instruments, financial
resources and the Community’s analytical and organiza-
tional capacities in order to introduce in all areas the desire
to build balanced relationships between women and men.”
This statement from the Commission (1996) clearly resonates
with the grand objectives of the White Paper to “open up policy-
making,” to “connect the EU more closely to its citizens and
lead to more effective policies.” The White Paper aims to harness
five principles of good governance—openness, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence—in order to
overcome the perceived legitimacy gap infecting the EU and its
institutions. Although work on “public spheres” has begun to
establish the gendered nature of such legitimacy gaps, gender is
ignored in the White Paper. The focus on “better regulation
through a greater diversity of policy tools and their combined
use,” although fleshed out in places with references to the open
method of co-ordination, the role of the social partners and
techniques of “co-regulation,” does not extend to identifying the
possible contribution to “better regulation” made by gender
mainstreaming.
The White Paper is quick to deal with “powers,” but slow to
face head on the question of “power.” Gender is primordially a
power question (Shaw, 2000). To follow the gender
mainstreaming project to its logical conclusion is to raise some
fundamental questions about who decides who gets what, where
and how. Gender mainstreaming can be an empowerment project
in much the same way that the reconsideration of “governance”
could potentially be empowering. Cram (2001) suggests that
national conditions, including resistance to reform, will play a
huge role in determining the impact of governance reforms at the
domestic level. Similarly, Beveridge et al. (2000) chart a huge
diversity of national conditions affecting gender mainstreaming
and gender equality regimes. Issues of “fit” at the national level
can dominate in both cases. Moreover, both governance reform
and gender mainstreaming are political not technocratic projects.
It is regrettable and indeed remarkable that the insights of one
innovative governance project in relation to gender mainstreaming
have not been brought to bear in the formulation of another
broader project of reform.
The marginalization of feminist politics in the Convention
and the White Paper, combined with the slow pace of adaptation
on the part of the Court of Justice, makes it clear that the
embedding of mainstreaming in the constitutional politics of the
EU has some way yet to go.
Jo Shaw is Professor of European Law and Jean Monnet
Chair at the University of Manchester.
Our European Enigma: Assessing Progress
R. Amy Elman
ASSESSMENTS OF EUROPE’S “PROGRESS” toward (sexual) equality
often reveal more about our conceptions of what equality is than
whether and to what extent Europe has been able (or willing) to
achieve it.  Thus, as some embrace Article 119 and subsequent
legislation as significant remedy for gender inequality, others
aver that European law legitimates capital accumulation while
appearing opposed to the gendered inequities associated with it.
Similarly, while reforms for “working mothers” are arguably
essential to gender equality, the very term also implies that
women’s primary status (and responsibility) is motherhood and
that working (for wages) is secondary.EUSA Review    Summer 2002
Understanding the historical trends, achievements and
shortcomings of efforts to ameliorate sexism is complicated. The
dynamic and pervasive quality of sexism, the unusual character
of Europe’s polity and the illusive goals of feminist movements
(e.g., to “take back the night,” “end male violence” and promote
“equality”) are only some of the conditions that make “progress”
difficult to discern.  This essay focuses on these and other factors
that haunt our efforts to make sense of sexual equality within the
context of European integration.
While women’s movements generated the public outrage that
likely prompted member-state and Union action against sexual
inequality, the general reluctance to define women’s movements
clearly hampers our efforts to measure their effect. Moreover, to
what extent have other social conditions and/or actors (for
whatever the reasons) inspired efforts to counter sexism? In sum,
what counts as evidence in determining Europe’s progress toward
ending sex discrimination?
“Feminism” is a term so fraught with dissension over its
meaning and application that the relatively more inclusive term
“women’s movement(s)” has either substituted for or been used
interchangeably with it. This linguistic shift diminished some
problems and others emerged. First, while feminist movements
are women’s movements, not all women’s movements are feminist
and some actually insist on their opposition to or distance from
feminism. The erroneous assumption that women in movements
are feminists suggests that being female is synonymous with being
a feminist. Expecting one’s experience of oppression to produce
an emancipatory politics is essentialist and inevitably disappoints
those seeking liberation because oppression produces damaged
people at least as often as it produces effectual activists. The
tenor of definitional inclusion compromises strategic effectiveness
for movement activists while jeopardizing epistemological and
methodological precision for scholars of movements.
In the absence of conceptual clarity concerning women’s
movements and their influence, direct evidence of gender
inequality and/or remedies ostensibly adopted to address it may
hold greater appeal. In compensating for the dearth of historical
detail, scholars use macro-data that unambiguously reveals
gender inequality in political representation (i.e., fewer women
in positions of power), the wage labor market (i.e., lower wages
and benefits), and “the family” (i.e., “the double burden”). These
data and related remedies for “working women” in general and
“working mothers” in particular are so prominent that their utility
is rarely interrogated.
If the emphasis extended to “work” and “family” mirrored
empirical reality, this stress might be less objectionable. Yet,
however important these issues are to many women, not least to
those writing on this subject, they were not (and have not been)
as integral to feminist activists as the literature on “women’s
movements” would suggest. For many, the conundrum of
combining (paid) work with family (read “care work” for male
partners and children) was (and is) less important than efforts to
transcend the confines of this conventional lifestyle (and
burdensome expectation). Indeed, more women than ever
throughout Europe are opting out of or postponing marriage and
motherhood.
Given the current climate, why are working mothers the
“hegemonic subject” of scholars? According to Lisa D. Brush
(forthcoming), politics play a decisive role in the persistent
preoccupation of scholars in the selection of their case studies
and the relatively circumscribed approach to research that they
take. She notes that the reliance on standard measures produces
scholarship that addresses women in comparison to men but
does not assess women in their social relation to them. In
consequence, “the cultural, sexual, physical, and emotional
enforcement of male dominance goes unmeasured, unremarked,
and unchallenged” (Brush, forthcoming). If analogous claims
can be made concerning the consequences of privileging working
mothers as the key beneficiaries of Europe’s equality policies,
are there alternative policies and critical analyses that may better
facilitate sexual equality?
Years ago I placed my faith in the utility of case studies and
policies adopted to mitigate male violence because, I argued,
male dominance is clearly expressed in the violence and sexual
abuse that men and boys perpetrate against women and girls. I
thus asserted that efforts to end male violence and penalize the
perpetrators reveal a greater responsiveness to women on the
part of capitalist states than the more conventional policies that
are of interest to most researchers on women, the (“welfare”)
state and European integration. After the Commission’s adoption
of a community-wide information campaign on violence against
women (i.e., the Daphne Program) and the explosion of interest
in and rhetorical statements on this subject, I wonder.
Previously determined to promote social change by ending
male violence, feminist activists began resembling poster children
for the same states and EU institutions they once challenged, if
not loathed. If not for an appreciation of the unintended
consequences of strategic actions, one would be at a loss to
explain this transformation. After states acknowledged their
apathy and attributed it to the expense of policies that could prove
beneficial to women, feminists began reversing these arguments
to show the cost of oppression both to states and their reputations.
After insisting that the effects of battering spilled over into the
workplace at considerable loss to the economy (through lowered
productivity and increased absenteeism due to injuries), activist
claims resonated not just with member-states but with the EU.
The increased interest among Europe’s policy-makers in
mitigating male violence, moreover, corresponded to escalating
public concern throughout the member states. In 1997, the
European Commission released a report acknowledging that male
violence is the most endemic form of violence within all member
states.  The following year, the European Parliament designated
1999 as the “European Year Against Violence Against Women.”
The Commission concomitantly proposed funding for
investigations into the problem as well as the community-wide
information campaign, Daphne.
Though too soon to tell, it is likely that the above-noted
Community efforts will provide remedy to some and prove
illusory to many. That is because when the framing, chain of
political command, and market structures relating to women’s
oppression remain intact, illusion masks the absence of redress.
National reputation is an essential part of any state’s strategicSummer 2002   EUSA Review
equity, particularly now that “globalization and the media
revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image,
its reputation, and its attitude—in short, its brand” (Van Ham
2001: 3). Market-oriented Europe is no less brand-oriented and,
as Peter Van Ham wisely warns, branding holds a “preference
for style over substance” (ibid.). State and EU action is taken to
increase legitimacy much as corporate sponsorship is an
investment in future profit. Such acts are not movement actions
determined to liberate women—they are marketing tools. The
extent to which the public perceives that sexual equality has
progressed and credits Europe with this success, the acts are
wise investments—whether or not the product is compassion
without the effort taken so that it is not needed.
Problems of measurement render an authoritative assessment
of Europe’s progress impossible to provide. However, questioning
what progress means encourages us to better understand our
capacity to initiate change in ways that might convince us that
progress is possible.
R. Amy Elman is Professor of Political Science at Kalamazoo
College.
Managing Diversity: Non-Discrimination and
the European Union
Mark Bell
EU LAW ON DISCRIMINATION has been subject to a dynamic series
of changes in recent years. These stem from the decision of the
member states in 1997 to add a new legal competence for
combating discrimination to the EC Treaty, Article 13. This
provision extended the material scope for anti-discrimination law
beyond the labour market, as well as providing the Community
with powers to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, racial
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual
orientation. In this essay, three trends are examined: first, the
adoption of new instruments for combating discrimination;
second, the application of non-discrimination norms to a wider
range of grounds; and third, the extension of the material scope
of discrimination law. Whilst progress has been made in all these
areas, it is argued that there is little clarity as to the underlying
vision or ultimate legal framework.
Adopting New Strategies and Instruments
Three Directives on combating discrimination have been
adopted since the introduction of Article 13. First, in June 2000,
the Council adopted the “Racial Equality Directive” (2000/43/
EC, OJ L180/22) forbidding discrimination on grounds of racial
or ethnic origin in a range of areas, such as employment, education
and health care. Second, in November 2000, the Council adopted
the “Framework Directive” (2000/78/EC, OJ L303/16)
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief,
disability, age and sexual orientation, but only in the (broadly
defined) area of employment. Finally, on 17 May 2002, the
Parliament and Council agreed a series of amendments to the
1976 Equal Treatment Directive, which forbids gender
discrimination in employment. Significantly, each of these
Directives pursues a number of new strategies.
First, there is a wider definition of unlawful discrimination.
Indirect discrimination is redefined in order to move away from
the existing dependence on statistical evidence (e.g. Case C-167/
97 Seymour-Smith [1999] ECR I-623). Instead, the new standard
focuses on situations where “an apparently neutral provision,
criterion or practice would put persons [with particular
characteristics, e.g. a disability] at a particular disadvantage.”
Harassment is also explicitly prohibited as well as any
instructions to discriminate by third parties. Second, there is a
new stress on enforcement and remedies. Victimization of
complainants is forbidden and the sanctions adopted by national
law are required to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”
More importantly, the need to support individual litigants is
recognised: organizations with a “legitimate interest” in enforcing
equal treatment can bring cases on behalf of individuals, and
member states must establish “equal treatment bodies” with a
duty to provide independent assistance to victims of
discrimination. Strangely though, such bodies need only cover
discrimination based on sex and racial or ethnic origin.
Extending the Umbrella of Protection
As noted above, Article 13 gave the Community a clear
mandate to apply non-discrimination principles beyond the
existing “suspect” grounds of sex and nationality. Yet, the
European Union has since added a further and broader layer of
protection in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000, OJ C364/
01). The Charter provides a statement of the fundamental rights
recognised by the Union. However, disagreement amongst the
member states at the time of its conclusion meant that it has an
ambivalent legal status. It is not part of the founding Treaties
and hence not legally binding. Nonetheless, reference to its norms
by the Court of First Instance and Advocates-General at the Court
of Justice suggest that the Charter will certainly have legal effects.
Article 21 provides a non-exhaustive list of grounds on which
discrimination is prohibited. In addition to the grounds already
recognized in the EC Treaty, reference is made to colour, social
origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property and birth.
An unusual hierarchy emerges as a result. First, there is
discrimination on grounds of EU nationality, which, by virtue of
the directly effective rights conferred in Article 12 EC, is
prohibited throughout Community law and seemingly in most
areas of national law (e.g. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001]
ECR I-6193). Second, the grounds found in Article 13 can,
through the passage of EC legislation, become forbidden areas
of discrimination in national law. Finally, the remaining grounds
only appearing in the Charter are, at least, likely to be regarded
by the Court of Justice as suspect classifications as regards
differential treatment within EU law, but in respect of which the
Union enjoys no powers to adopt implementing legislation.
Moving Beyond the Labour Market
The other new trend is the application of non-discrimination
norms to areas outside employment. Whilst this was already true
for the prohibition of nationality discrimination, Community law
on sex discrimination applied primarily in situations connected
to participation in employment. In contrast, the Racial Equality
Directive additionally covers the areas of “social protection,EUSA Review    Summer 2002
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including social security and healthcare; social advantages;
education; and access to and supply of goods and services which
are available to the public, including housing” (Article 3(1)).
However, these are subject to the important, if vague, caveat
that it is only in so far as these issues fall “within the limits of
the powers conferred upon the Community.” Given the blurred
boundaries of EC legal competence in areas such as healthcare
or education, the scope of the non-discrimination requirement
remains ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the Council has already committed itself to the
adoption of further legislation on gender equality in areas outside
employment (European Social Agenda, [2001] OJ C157/4) and
there are active campaigns for similar legislation on grounds of
disability and sexual orientation. The experience of applying the
1976 Equal Treatment Directive means that the Court of Justice
already possesses a rich body of case-law from which to draw
principles when confronted with questions surrounding the
employment provisions of the new anti-discrimination Directives.
However, the promotion of equality in education, for example,
will present the Court with new challenges, such as the legal
scope for positive action in this area.
A Coherent Vision of Equality and Diversity?
The transformation of EU anti-discrimination law has
provided a welcome revitalization, rather than continued reliance
on the stale legal framework provided in the 1976 Equal
Treatment Directive. Moreover, the Directives are producing a
trickle-down effect by stimulating debate across the member
states, as well as the EU applicant states, on how best to
(re)construct anti-discrimination law.  For the most part, the new
Directives should enhance protection against discrimination at
the national level; however, there is also the potential for EU
norms to disrupt established legal traditions and frameworks. In
particular, the Article 13 initiatives have not reduced the pre-
existing equality hierarchy within EU law. On the contrary, new
hierarchies have emerged and there is an evident lack of
consistency between the various legislative initiatives. This is
problematic for national legal systems based around common
standards for all forms of discrimination; indeed, the Directives
may provide the opportunity for the emergence or exaggeration
of national equality hierarchies. The challenge for the Union is
to ensure that the end product is not a discrimination law of “bits
and pieces,” but a coherent and consistent framework for
promoting equality.
Mark Bell is Lecturer in the Centre for European Law and
Integration, University of Leicester.
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